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I n t h i s p a p e r a n a p p l i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t i a l game theory in the area of microeconomics is pres e n t e d , The problem considered is t h a t of dynamic duopoly where two f i r m s e a c h l i m i t e d by a maximum c a p a c i t y of p r o d u c t i o n , s h a r e t h e same market, and try simultaneously but independently to maximize t h e i r p r o f i t s o v e r a c e r t a i n p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n . Uecessary conditions for the Cournot Solution in t h e g e n e r a l c a s e are d i s c u s s e d and more s p e c i f i c r e s u l t s f o r t h e s p e c i a l c a s e o f l i n e a r demand and q u a d r a t i c c o s t f u n c t i o n s are developed.
I n t r o d u c t i o n S t a t i c and comparative static formulations of the duopoly game f o l l o w i n g t h e l i n e of Cournot [ l ) a n d S t a c k e l b e r g [ 2 ] f l o u r i s h e d i n t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s a f t e r t h e p a t h -b r e a k i n g work of von
Neumann and Morgenstern [3] , Theory of Games and Economic Beh a v i o r . Zero-sum o r non-zero-sum, two (or n) person games, c o o p e r a t i v e o r n o n c o o p e r a t i v e games, e t c . are w e l l documented (see Shubik 141, f o r i ns t a n c e ) . M e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , t h e s t a t i c and traditional duopoly theory seems t o h a v e f a i l e d t o a c ti v e l y i n t e r a c t w i t h game theoretic approaches (see Osborne [5] ).
It may b e w o r t h w h i l e t o p o i n t o u t t h a t l o g ic a l developments of the traditional duopoly
game i n its comparative static sense, by taking advantage of a type of sequentialdeeision-making procedures i n r e a c h i n g some r e a s o n a b l e s o l u t i o n s s u c h as t h e models of [SI, may have taken a step towards the dynamization of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y .
However, these models are s t i l l not completely dynamic i n nature. For ins t a n c e , i n t h e C y e r t a n d
DeGroot model it is assumed t h a t d e c i s i o n s are made s e q u e n t i a l l y i n alter- continuous time as a non-zero-sum d i f f e r e n t i a l game problem. A similar d i s c r e t e time v e r s i o n of t h i s model can also be formulated. In this model we assume t h a t t h e demand curve is described by a d i f f e r e n t i a l e q u a t i o n which g i v e s a t e a c h i n s t a n t of time t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p r i c e o f t h e commodity, t h e rate of change of t h e p r i c e and t h e production outputs of b o t h f i r m s .
W e assume t h a t e a c h f i r m ' s o b j e c t i v e is t o maximize i t s t o t a l d i sc o u n t e d p r o f i t s o v e r a prespecified time horizon. A g e n e r a l f o r m u l a t i o n a n d s o l u t i o n o f t h i s m o d e l , and a comparison between the Cournot and C o l l u s i v e behaviors of b o t h f i r m s h a s b e e n p r e s e n t e d i n [ 9 ] . I n t h i s p a p e r w e g i v e a complete characterization of t h e C o u r n o t s o l u t i o n e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h e c a s e where each firm has a maximum production capacity that cannot be exceeded.
W e show that the Cournot solution can be a combination of s e v e r a l p o s s i b i l ities where each firm may e i t h e r s t a y o u t of t h e market, place i t s maximun; s u p p l y i n t h e m a r k e t , a c t as a m o n o p o l i s t , o r s h a r e t h e m a r k e t w i t h Even though d i f f e r e n t i a l game theory has recently received a g r e a t d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n i n t h e c o n t r o l l i t e r a t u r e , v e r y l i t t l e has been done in applying i t t o microeconomic problems. The simple, single commodity, model c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s p a p e r p r o v i d e s s u c h a n a p p l i c a t i o n and d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t u s e f u l c o n c e p t u a l r e s u l t s c a n b e o b t a i n e d . B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h e dynamic formulation, l e t u s f i r s t b r i e f l y r e v i e w t h e s t a t i c d u o p o l y model as formulated by Cournot .
S t a t i c Cournot Duopoly Model
Let x and x b e t h e o u t p u t s of f i r m s 1 and 2 r e s p e c t i v e I y , a n d l e t t h e commodity p r i c e p be r e l a t e d t o x L + x by t h e f o l l o w i n g well behaved c o n t i n u o u s a n d d i g f e r e n t i a b l e ( i n R+) demand funct i o n : + P a r t o f t h i s work was d o n e w h i l e t h e f i r s t a u t h o r was a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s . S u p p o r t f o r t h i s work was p r o v i d e d i n p a r t by t h e J o i n t S e r v i c e s E l e c t r o n i c s Program under Contract No. DAAB-07-72-C-0259 and i n p a r t by NSF under Grant No. GK 36276 with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, and in p a r t by t h e Ford Foundation, World Bank, and USDA-ERS.
Il (x x ) = xlh(x1+X2) -gl(xl) f o r Firm 1, and I f x1 and x are n o t c o n s t r a i n e d t h e n t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s p r o b l e m as proposed by Cournot i s d e t e w i n e d i n terms of t h e r e a c t i o n f u n c t i o n s w h i c h s p e c i f y t h e o u t p u t of one firm i n terms of t h e o u tput of t h e o t h e r f i r m ( s e e I n t r i l i g a t o r 1101). These functio-ns are obrained from:
-
The terns a x l a X and a x1 I a x 2 a r e c a l l e d N c o n j e Ct u r a l v a r i a t $ o n s t J t e r m s a n d t h e y r e f l e c t t h e e f f e c t of v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e o u t p u t Of one firm on t h e o u tput of t h e o t h e r f i r m .
I n the Cournot analysis, t h e s e terms a r e assumed t o b e z e r o .
The S o l u t i o n of t h e two simultaneous equatJons in*(3) yields the Cournot equilibrium outputs and x2. I n t h e c a s e where h(x +x is l i n e a r i n (X1+x2) and g i b i ) i s q u a d r a t i c i n x i f o r i = 1 , 2 :
, a i > 0 i = 1,2 t h e n , t h e s o l u t i o n of ( 3 ) w i t h z e r o c o a j e c t u r a l v a r i a t i o n s i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : (6) and it f o l l o w s t h a t x; = @+ai)
2

It i s important t o n o t e t h a t t h e o p t i m a l
Cournot outputs x$ and x$ derived by t h e above proc e d u r e s a t i s f y t h e f o l l o w i n g set o f i n e q u a l i t i e s :
n (x* x* > 11 (X*,X2) 2 1 9 2 -1 1
Dynamic Cournot Duopoly Model The model t h a t we s h a l l d i s c u s s i n t h i s s e ct i o n is e s s e n t i a l l y a "dynaraiz-ation" of t h e s t a t i c m o d e l d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . L e t t h e demand function be described
by t h e f o l l o w i n g d i f fe r e n t i a l e q u a t i o n :
where {O,T] i s t h e p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n , x ( t ) = x ( t ) + x 2 ( t ) i s t h e sum o f t h e o u t p u t s x ( t ) and x,($) of b o t h f i r m s r e s p e c t i v e l y a n d 
I f , a t a c e r t a i n time t1
# 0 for some r e a s o n s u c h a s t h e m a r k e t p r i c h d u r i n i i t s adjustment process was not high (low) enough, resulting in a smaller ( l a r ge r ) s u p p l y q u a n t i t y a p p e a r i n g i n t h e m a r k e t t h a n what the m a r k e t a c t u a l l y d e s i r e d a t t h a t p r i c e 1eveS
t h e n t h e m a r k e t p r i c e moves i n t h e d i r e c t i o n s t i p ul a t e d by e q u a t i o n (9). Equilibrium conditions are reached when h ( t , x ( t ) ) -p ( t > = 0 f o r a l l t. The rationale above is a genuinely dynamic p r i c e a d j u s tment mechanism and i s considered to be a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n o f t h e s t a t i c p r i c e r e s p o n s e f u n c t i o n (see Nikaido [12] ). If
and i f we assume t h a t a & < 0 for all E { o ,~] , then i t f o l l o w s t h a t a x 3 2 < 0 and 3 2 < 0 ( n o t e thataf
a p a x a x x i a x -It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t e q u a t i o n (9) r e l a t e s t h e p r i c e a t time t t o t h e p r i c e a t a previous time t and t o t h e e n t i r e h i s t o r y of t o t a l s u p p l y x ( ? ) f & r T i n t h e i n t e r v a l I t , , t ] . F u n c t i o n a l l y t h i s c a n b e w r i t t e n as (12) P ( t ) * ( P ( t l ) ; X b ) ,
where @ i s t h e t r a j e c t o r y of t h e s o l u t i o n of equat i o n ( 9 ) f o r a given po and x ( t ) . Thus t h i s "dynamic demand" f u p c t i o p (9) can ke i n t e r p r e t e d a s a
R+ is the non-negative part of t h e real l i n e and C [O,t] is the space of measurable non-negative f u n c t i o n s d e f i n e d on [ O , t ] . T h u s , i n c o n t r a s t t o thestatic market theory which does not address its e l f t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r o c e s s by whichchanges i n the p r i c e are brought about, but only compares t h e p r i c e s b e f o r e a n d a f t e r t h e c h a n g e t a k e s p l a c e , t h e dynamic market theory investigates how t h e p r i c e changes with time and w h a t t r a j e c t o r y it follows.
In s t a t i c market theory i t is well-knownthat thedemand function has t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t " a n i nc r e a s e ( . d e c r e a s e ) i n t h e t o t a l m a r k e t s u p p l y w i l l CauSea d e c r e a s e ( i n c r e a s e ) i n t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of t h e c o m o d i t y " . W e s h a l l show n e x t t h a t t h i s p r o -P e r t y a l s o h o l d s t r u e , l o c a l l y , f o r o u r dynamic m a r k e t ; t h a t is i f ( j ( t ) , i i ( t ) ) i s a t r a j e c t o r y sati s f y i n g f i ( t 1 = f ( $ ( t ) , i ( t ) ) , t E [O,T] f o r a given Po* then a P o s i t i Y e ( n e g a t i v e ) p e r t u r b a t i o n i n s ( t )
W i l l c a u s e -a n e g a t i v e ( p o s i t i v e ) f i r s t o r d e r p e e u rb a t i o n i n p ( t ) .
P r o P o s i t i o n ; The c o n d i t i o n -<
0 implies tha-t-for any p a i r ( i ( t ) , x ( t ) f s a t i s f & g ( 9 1 , i f x ( t ) = x ( t ) f 6x(t) where 6x(t) 0 Y t E [O,T]; t h e n p i t ) = p ( t ) .t 6 p ( t ) + h i g h e r o r d e r terms where,6p(t) 5
(Note t h a t t h e same proof holds if t h e s i g n o f 6 x ( t ) a n d 6 p ( t ) a r e r e v e r s e d ) .
The Condition ar < o follows from (11). Linearize equation
r o u n d t h e t r a j e c t o r y ( $ ( t ) .i(tf)
by expanding the RHS i n a Taylor series expansion. The first o r d e r terms g i v e t h e l i n e a r d i f f e r e n t i a l e q u a t i o n :
The s o l u i i o n o f t h i s e q u a t i b n is
where @(t,~) is t h e s y s t e m ' s state t r a n s i t i o n m at r i x . C l e a r l y a A < O and ~x ( T ) 2 0 imply t h a t
In t h e p r i c e a d j u s t m e n t p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d above, the supply quantities x ( t ) and x ( t ) are 1 2 t r e a t e d as decision variables chosen independently by e a c h f i r m i n o r d e r t o maximize i t s t o t a l p r o f i t s . I f we assume t h a t g i ( t , x i ( t ) ) , a c o n v e x f u n c t i o n i n x ( t ) , is t h e c o s t of production a t time t , p e r u n i t t f m e f o r f i r m i, t h e n t h e p r o f i t s a c c u m u l a t e d by f i r m i o v e r t h e h o r i z o n IO.Tl c a n b e w r i t t e n as:
where ri is a n a p p r o p r i a t e d i s c o u n t rate f o r f i r m i .
Thus, t h e dynamic duopoly problem we a r e considering (9)- (13) i s a d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of nonzero-sum d i f f e r e n t i a l game theory. While t h e r e are s e v e r a l a p p r o a c h e s f o r s o l v i n g non-zero-sum d i f f e r e n t i a l game problems (see [13-161 f 
i . e .
-xl(t,p(t)) and x2 = x , ( t , p ( t ) ) . The admissi-:le s t r a t e g y s p a c e s x and x f o r f i r m s 1 and 2 r e s p e c t i v e l y are t h e d f o r e t i e c o l l e c t i o n of a l l such functions of t and p ( t ) f o r which (9) has a unique well-defined solution.
The Courngt golution f o r t h i s problem is d e f i n e d a s a p a i r (x1 x2) with x! €x1 and x$ €x2 s u c h t h a t t h e set of i n b q u a l i t i e s i n (8) is s a t i s f i e d w i t h i'IlandI12 as given by (13).
Upon a p p l y i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l game r e s u l t s d e v e l o p e d i n [ 1 3 ] , t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d l t i o n s f o r t h e
Cournot solution of the above problem can be writte n a s f o l l o w s : F i r s t d e f i n e t h e H a m i l t o n i a n f u n c ti o n s : ( 1 5 4 w ) = f ( p ( t ) , x l ( t , p ( t ) ) + x 2 ( t , P ( t m , P(0) = Po with (15f) hl(T) -0 and A2(Tf = 0 as boundary conditions for (15b) and (15c).
In t h e a b o v e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e d i s c o u n t i n g f a c t o r s e -r i t have been eliminated by r e d e f i n i n g t h e adj o s n t v a r i a b l e s as d e s c r i b e d i n [ 1 7 ] . S i n c e g i ( t , x i ( t ) > i = 1,2 are assumed t o be convex i n x and i f , a s r e q u i r e d by economic cons i d e r a t i o n s : c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t s on production are imposed, t h a t is if
(16) xi = k i ( t , P ( t ) ) : 0 5 x i ( t , p ( t > ) 5 xi) for i = 1 , 2 where X is t h e maximum p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y f o r t h e i t h i firm, then (15d) and (15e) reduce to the following:
( 1 7 4
. T h u s , t h e s o l u t i o n may e x h i b i t a n y c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e n i n e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of (17a)-( 1 7 c ) f o r i = 1,each holding over a s u b -i n t e r v a l of time i n [O,T]. T h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e t a t u l a ted i n T a b l e 1; and whether a p o s s i b i l i t y is a p a r t of t h e s o l u t i o n o r n o t i s determined by the parameters of t h e p r o b l e m a n d t h e i n i t i a l p r i c e p . a g i (17b) p i t ) -a -+Ai(t)-xi S i n c e i n g e n e r a l i t is a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e t o o b t a i n a n a n a l y t i c s o l u t i o n f o r t h e c o u p l e d p a rt i a l d i f f e r e n t i a l e q u a t i o n s ( 1 5 ) -( 1 7 ) , we s h a l l i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n d i s c u s s t h e s o l u t i o n f o r t h e s p e c i a l case of l i n e a r demand and q u a d r a t i c c o s t f u n c t i o n s . It i s i m p o r t a n t t o m e n t i o n t h a t t h i s s p e c i a l case can be considered as a f i r s t o r d e r approximation of the local behavior
of corresponding non-linear duopoly problems. 
o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e S o l u t i o n of t h e Duopoly Market x1 = X,(t,P(t))
, x2 = X 2 ( t , P ( t ) )
. Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Duopoly Model
Let t h e demand f u n c t i o n (9) be l i n e a r of t h e form: . are imposed. In ( 2 
) t h e f u n c t i o n p ( t ) is t h e p r i c e t r a j e c t o r y s a t i s f y i n g e q u a t i o n ( 8 ) . F u r t h e rmore, i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h a t p ( t ) d o e s n o t c r o s s t o t h e n e g a t i v e r e g i o n ,
we s h a l l assume t h a t X + X2 5 5 . Thus, i f we d e f i n e q ( t ) = ( c / b ) -p ( t $ then i t follows from (18) that (22) ;I(t) 1. -a q ( t ) and hence q ( t ) 2 0 f o r a l l t. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t P ( t ) 5 5 f o r a l l t . The r e g i o n of i n t e r e s t i s t h e r e f o r e a r e c t a n g l e in t h e p -x p l a n e d e f i n e d by 0 5 p 5 and 0 5 x <_ . Applying the necess?ry conhtions (15)- (17) we g e t :
f o r i = 1 , 2 and with X1(T) = ;X2(T) = 0. The solut i o n of the above system of equations can be represented by t h e f o l l o w i n g n i n e p o s s i b i l i t i e s as s u ma r i z e d in Table 1. Case 1 * Condition (23e) kolds for both firms. That is x , ( t , p ( t ) ) = 0 and x 2 ( t , p ( t ) ) = 0. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t p ( t ) < bXi f o r i = 1 , 2 . But [13] hi = aVihp
Then, t h i s c o n d i t i o n means t h a t when t h e p r i c e becomes less t h a n b 8 V i b p ( t h e m a r g i n a l r e v e n u e s ) f o r i = 1 , 2 , b o t h f i r m s w i l l not be accumulating any p r o f i t s a n d h e n c e t h e i r b e s t p o l i c y is t o s t a y o u t of t h e m a r k e t . , T h i s n a t u r a l l y c a u s e s t h e p r i c e t o i n c r e a s e s i n c e p ( t )
= c -a p ( t ) > 0.
Case 2a
Condition (23e) holds for firm 1 and Condi-
That is, x l ( t , p ( t ) ) -Oand x i ( t , p ( t ) ) 2 0 . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t p ( t )
e ca vl/ap f o r f i r m 1 and p ( t ) > b a V / a p f o r f i r m 2; and as a r e s u l t i t is o n l y p r o f i t a b l e f o r f i r m 2 t o e n t e r the market. Thus, firm 2 i s now a c t i n g as a monop o l i s t w i t h no influence from i t s r i v a l f i r m . The necessary conditions which maximize its p r o f i t s follow directly from (23a), (23b) and (23e). The monopolistic behavior of firm 2 has been separately s t u d i e d i n [ 1 8 ] a n d t h e r e s u l t s c a n b e d i r e c t l y a p p l i e d i n t h i s case. W e only mention howeverthat t h e optimum s u p p l y r u l e f o r f i r m 2 is a n a f f i n e f u n c t i o n i n p ( t ) , of the form x; ( t , p ( t ) ) = K 2 ( t ) p ( t ) + E2(t) where K2(t) and E 2 ( t ) a r e f u n ct i o n s of time, determined, and with properties as described in [ 181.
Case 2b ( t , p ( t ) ) X1and
is a monopolist d o saturateS t h e m a r k e t w i t h h i s p r o d u c t c o l l e c t i n g maximum prof i t s , w h i l e f i r m 1 c a n n o t a f f o r d t o s e l l the prod u c t a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p r i c e , a n d t h e r e f o r e s t a y s o u t of the market.
x X ( t , p ( t ) ) 2 0. T h i s is the dual of case 4a.
Case 5
Condition (23f) holds for both firms. That is x:(t,p(t)) -X1 and x ; ( t , p ( t ) ) = X2 and p ( t ) > ba Vila p f o r b o t h f irms. Both f irms p l a c e t h e i r maximum o u t p u t s i n t h e m a r k e t and r e a l i z e maximum p r o f i t s w i t h o u t a n y c o m p e t i t i v e e f f o r t .
Case 6
Condition (23d) holds for both firms and this r e p r e s e n t s a t r u e d u o p o l y s i t u a t i o n w h e r e b o t h f i r m s a r e a c t i v e l y engaged i n a competitive market. While i n a l l p r e v i o u s c a s e s we d i d n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e between closed-loop (feedback) and open-loop supply c u r v e s s i n c e t h e y b o t h l e a d t o t h e same s o l u t i o n ; i n t h i s case we must d i f f e r e n t i a t e between them b e c a u s e ( s e e I l 3 1 ) t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g s o l u t i o n s a r e d i f f e r e n t . W e d i s c u s s e a c h c a s e s e p a r a t e l y .
(a) Closed-loop (feedback) Supply Curves * In t h i s case x are s t r i c t l y f u n c t i o n s of t and p ( t ) , It c a n e a s i l y b e c h e c k e d t h a t t h e
Two
Point Boundary Value problem (23a), (23b), (23c) and (23e) admits affine supply curves as a s o l u t i o n . , A f t e r some simple algebraic manipulations, i t can be shown [91 t h a t
f o r 1 = 1 , 2 , j = 1 , 2 and 1 f j . Equations (27) [O,T] , then t h e boundary conditions for (27) and (28) is obtain-' t = t where, X ( t ) , i -1 , 2 are e x p r e s s e d i n terms of Ki(t) an4 Ei(t) as: 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e a b o v e s o l u t i o n , t h e
Two P o i n t Boundary Value problem (23a), (23b), (23c) and (23e) also admits supply curves which are s t r i c t l y functions of time only as s o l u t i o n . In t h i s case t h e t e r m s a x / a p in (23b) and (23c) w i l l v a n i s h and the solution can be obtained by d i r e c t l y s o l vi n g t h e r e s u l t i n g c o u p l e d s y s t e m o f l i n e a r o r d i na r y d i f f e r e n t i a l e q u a t i o n s . A n o t h e r way which t r a n s f o r m s t h e s y s t e m i n t o a single point boundary problem is t o f o l l o w a procedure similar t o t h e closed-loop case. I f we assume t h a t h i ( t ) , i = 1 , 2 c a n b e w r i t t e n i n t h e form : (31) hi(t)
then (23a) The open-loop Cournot supply functions are then obtained from (23d) as:
The f u n c t i o n s D,(t) and F ( t ) c a n b e shown t o be s o l u t i o n s o f t h e d i f f e r e n f i a l e q u a t i o n s on t h e c u r r e n t p r i c e i n t h e m a r k e t . I d e a l l y , b o t h s o l u t i o n s g u a r a n t e e a Cournot-type equilibrium in which no f i r m h a s a n i n c e n t i v e t o c h e a t .
However, i n t h e f e e d b a c k c a s e , i f o n e f i r m c h e a t s t h e o t h e r f i r m a u t o m a t i c a l l y a d j u s t s its s u p p l y , a f t e r d e t e c t i n g t h e r e s u l t i n g change i n t h e p r e v a i l i n g p r i c e in t h e m a r k e t . I n t h e open-loop case this cannot be done since each f i r m i s committed t o a production program that s p e c i f i e s a t each t t h e q u a n t i t y t o b e s u p p l i e d t o the market.
However, i n b o t h c a s e s , t h e f i r m t h a t a t t e m p t s t o c h e a t w i l l s u f f e r a l o s s i n i t s p r o f i t s .
'These Xi's a r e d i f f e r e n t from the closedloop Ai's of eq. (30).
The feedback supplies also have thedesirable property that if an external disturbance that causes the price to deviate from its Cournot optimal trajectory takes place, then a Cournot equilibrium, with profits as defined in (24), will still hold for the remaining part of the trajectory. This is not so in the open-loop case.
Over the interval of time where duopolyprevails (case 6) the firms may negotiate what supply form to use. Naturally the one that leads to more profits is more desirable. However, from the consumer's point of view, it may seem that allowing the firms to adjust their supplies according to the prevailing price of the commodity in the market, will result in increased profits for the firms. While this may be so in some cases of monopolies or collusive duopolies; the competitive, noncooperative nature of the Cournot solution may actually result in a decrease in the profits of the firms.
Conclusion
In this paper, a dynamic duopoly problem where each firm is limited by a maximum production capacity has been formulated and solved within the framework of differential game theory. It was shown that the Cournot solution may be a combination of various possibilities which may include each firm either staying out of the market, or competing with its rival for a share of the market, or placing its maximum capacity in the market. Thus a Cournot solution of a dynamic duopoly problem may include sub-intervals of time where one firm acts independently as a monopolist. When a duopoly situation prevails, however, the Cournot supply curves can be either in feedback or in openloop forms, each leading to a different price trajectory. Necessary conditions for each case have been derived and it was shown that the closed-loop Cournot supply curves are always affine functions of the price. The marginal supplies (i.e. axi/ap) are shown to be functions of time that satisfy a set of Riccati-like differential equations.
